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WHOSE SHARED DESTINY?
Richard Rigby and Brendan Taylor
THE ‘COMMUNITY OF SHARED DESTINY’ 
is not a completely new concept in Chinese 
foreign policy — the Communist Party first 
used the term in 2007 in relation to cross-
Strait relations. But it is one that has gained 
greater prominence over the past year. A key 
development during this period was Xi Jinping’s 
October 2013 keynote speech at the ‘Workshop 
on Diplomatic Work with Neighbouring 
Countries’ 周边国家外交工作座谈会, during 
which he elaborated on the ‘shared destiny’ 
theme (sometimes translated into English as 
‘common destiny’): it was then that the term 
officially entered the Chinese foreign policy 
lexicon.
Image: Clashing martitime interests in the South China Sea
Source: vnexpressnews.net
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China is hardly alone in embracing foreign policy concepts that lack pre-
cision. Think of then US deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick’s call on 
China in 2005 to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and the call of then 
president Hu Jintao’s contemporaneous formulation for a ‘harmonious 
world’, for example, or Kevin Rudd’s 2008 vision of an ‘Asia-Pacific Com-
munity’ and ‘harmonious world’. At its heart, the concept of a ‘communi-
ty of shared destiny’ is essentially about ensuring peace and stability in 
China’s external strategic environment through the development of good 
relations with neighbouring countries. Ironically, it is difficult to recall a 
period, in recent history at least, where there has been such a substantial 
gap between Beijing’s public rhetoric and what it has been doing in prac-
tice, with the result that it has alienated, alarmed and infuriated many of 
its neighbours.
For some commentators, the ‘com-
munity of shared destiny’ represents a 
direct response to the US ‘pivot’ or strat-
egy of ‘re-balancing’. Yet, as recently as 
June 2013, hopes were high that even 
China and the US might have been able 
to work towards a ‘common destiny’ 
when presidents Xi and Barack Obama 
held their so-called ‘Sunnylands Sum-
In June 2013, presidents Obama and Xi met for a two-day informal summit at the 
Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands in California 
Source: The White House
China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning went 
into commission on 25 September 2012. Ru-
mours are rife that China is in the process 
of building a second aircraft carrier
Source: reddit.com
mit’ in California. Some observers even went so far as to liken the meeting 
to the Mao–Nixon diplomacy of the 1970s in terms of its geopolitical sig-
nificance. Ultimately, however, the outcomes of the summit were modest 
and relations between Beijing and Washington took on an increasingly 
competitive edge over the following twelve months. In December 2013, 
for instance, a standoff occurred in the waters of the South China Sea be-
tween an American Aegis cruiser, the USS Cowpens, and vessels escorting 
the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning. Chinese official media responses to 
this standoff asserted that ‘Washington has to understand that Beijing has 
the right to grow its national defence capacity in accordance with its own 
legitimate demands to protect national interests’.
New Models?
Relations between Beijing 
and Washington became 
even tenser in 2014. In May, 
the US Justice Department 
took the unprecedented step 
of indicting five officers of 
the PLA from the so-called 
‘Unit 61398’ in Shanghai, on 
charges of hacking into the 
networks of American com-
panies dealing with aero-
space, telecommunications, 
information technology, 
satellite and other sensitive 
areas, also including Westinghouse Electric and US Steel Corp. The charges 
were largely symbolic given that the US does not have an extradition trea-
ty with China — and in any case, China denies the army unit even exists. 
PLA ‘Unit 61398’ has allegedly hacked into the networks of  
more than 140 Western firms in pursuit of corporate secrets to  
support the Chinese government’s political and economic aims
Source: wantchinatimes.com
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Nevertheless, Beijing responded within hours 
of the indictment, denouncing the charges and 
calling in the US Ambassador to China, Max Bau-
cus. One month later, the Shangri-La Dialogue — 
an annual Asian security summit that is a use-
ful barometer for reading the state of relations 
between Beijing and Washington — displayed 
deepening tensions. There, PLA Deputy Chief 
Wang Guanzhong 王冠中 delivered ‘unscript-
ed’ remarks describing an earlier speech by US 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to the gathering as ‘full of hegemony and 
threats’. Taken together, the rhetoric associated with another of Xi Jinping’s 
central foreign policy concepts, or the ‘New Model of Great Power Rela-
tions’ 新型大国关系, seems far from the reality of Sino-US relations during 
the previous twelve months.
A policy paper published under the auspices of the Korean-based 
Asan Institute for Policy Studies in March 2014 advocates applying the 
concept of the New Model to the Sino-Japanese relationship. However, 
over the past twelve months, tensions between the two historical great 
powers of East Asia have deepened and may even descend into conflict. In 
November 2013, China controversially declared a new Air Defence Identi-
fication Zone (ADIZ) 防空识别区 over the East China Sea and covering the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. By February 2014, senior US military 
officials were accusing the PLA of preparing to fight a ‘short, sharp war’ 
against Japan designed to seize the disputed islands. 
Sino-Japanese Understanding
Relations worsened in April 2014 when the Shanghai Maritime Court 
seized a Japanese cargo ship, Baosteel Emotion, in relation to an unpaid 
compensation claim dating back to the mid-1930s, when Japan leased two 
Wang Guanzhong
Source: hk.crntt.com:
Silent Contest, by  Jeremy Goldkorn
Silent Contest 较量无声 is a low-budget gung-ho film produced by the General Logistics  
Department of the PLA and the National Defence University in mid-2013. It surfaced on the 
Internet in October 2013 only to be deleted soon after. Set to a portentous musical score, 
the film decries the collapse of the Soviet Union and accuses America of undermining the 
rise of China through military exchanges, consular activities, non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGO) and the propagation of Western values as well as Christianity. Among others 
it attacks the Ford Foundation, the Fulbright Scholarship program, the Carter Center, law 
professor and judicial reform activist He Weifang 贺卫方, eighty-four-year-old liberal econ-
omist Mao Yushi 茅于轼, electronic music and luxury brands as all harmful to the rule of the 
Communist Party and China’s future. The central thesis of the film is that the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was not caused by the end of the Cold War but rather the other way round, in 
other words, infiltration, ideological softening and sympathy for Western ideas destroyed 
the Soviet Union. Although the production date is unknown, the two-part ninety-three min-
ute film is assumed to have been made sometime after Xi Jinping’s inauguration as state 
leader in March 2013.  
The central thesis of the film harks back to the 1950s Cold War policies of John Foster 
Dulles and his brother Allen Dulles, who promoted peaceful evolution as well as covert 
activities to undermine countries in the socialist camp.
Tensions between Beijing and Washington escalated during the course of 2014
Source: tieba.baidu.com
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Chinese ships and later lost them at sea. Baosteel Emotion’s Japanese own-
er, Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd, swiftly resolved the conflict by paying the US$29 
million required to secure the release of the ship. A potentially far more 
deadly encounter occurred in May 2014 when Chinese SU-27 fighters re-
portedly flew as close as thirty metres from a Japanese surveillance plane 
operating near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a tactic the Japanese alleged 
was repeated again in mid-June. 
Peninsula Matters
Over the last year Beijing has also man-
aged to alienate two of its other key North-
east Asian neighbours, South and North 
Korea. In the case of the South, this was 
somewhat puzzling given that Beijing and 
Seoul seemed to be drawing closer in their 
mutual antipathy and suspicions toward 
Japan. The fact that the recently elect-
ed Park Guen-hye is the first South Korean president to speak Stand-
ard Chinese fluently only reinforced this growing intimacy. Yet Chi-
na’s ADIZ declaration upset Seoul: it covered not just the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands but also another set of disputed islets which the 
Koreans called Ieodo and the Chinese Suyan Rock. Seoul respond-
ed by expanding its own ADIZ and summoning the Chinese Defence 
attaché to lodge a protest. This issue reignited in May 2014 when Chinese 
and Russian forces staged a major joint military exercise approximately 
fifty kilometres from Ieodo/Suyan Rock. Seoul was further disenchanted 
with Beijing in May when it discovered more than 1,000 Chinese fishing 
vessels operating illegally in South Korean waters — a development that 
some commentators interpreted as China taking advantage of President 
Park’s decision, following the Sewol ferry sinking disaster, to dismantle the 
South Korean Coast Guard.
Park Guen-hye was sworn in as South 
Korea’s first female president in 2013. She 
is the daughter of former South Korean 
President Park Chung-hee
Source: 3news.co.nz
President Xi’s July 2014 visit to South Korea led to a downplaying of 
these tensions and also to commentary suggesting that China was intent 
upon driving a wedge between the United States and one of its key North-
east Asian allies. This possibility was apparently not lost on senior Amer-
ican officials. Testifying before Congress in June, for instance, Assistant 
Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Daniel Russel described Xi’s visit 
as ‘an extraordinary milestone’. The persistence of the existential North 
Korean threat to the South suggests that the prospects for an imminent 
strategic shift on Seoul’s part are remote at this juncture. Indeed, poll-
ing conducted by the Asan Institute suggests that, while perceptions of 
China are warming, the US remains South Korea’s most popular country 
and most important ally. If anything, the real historic significance of the 
Xi trip lay in the fact that he was the first Chinese leader to visit the South 
having not first visited the North.
The continued downturn in China’s 
relations with its longstanding North Ko-
rean ally continued to surprise. A signifi-
cant factor was North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-un’s execution of Jang Sung-taek — 
his uncle and the reclusive regime’s point 
man on China policy. One of Jang’s crimes 
was reportedly his closeness with China. 
Beijing appeared to have been completely 
blindsided by this development. Then, in 
March 2014, reports emerged that a North 
Korean missile test, of which Pyongyang 
had failed to warn Beijing in advance, 
missed a commercial Chinese jetliner carrying 220 passengers by a num-
ber of minutes. In May 2014, the Japanese press reported the existence of 
leaked Chinese contingency plans preparing for the collapse of North Kore-
an regime. Although Beijing vociferously denied these reports, Sino-North 
Korean relations grew even more strained.
Sino-North Korean relations deteriorate: In 
December 2013, North Korean leader Kim 
Jong-un ordered the execution of Jang Sung- 
taek — his uncle and key policy advisor on 
China policy
Source: Unknown
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All at Sea
China’s relations with the Philippines and Vietnam have also deteriorat-
ed badly during the last twelve months over other maritime disputes, 
these related to the South China Sea (which the Philippines calls the West 
Philippine Sea). Manila incurred Beijing’s wrath in March 2014 when it 
proceeded, in the face of strong Chinese opposition including threatened 
economic sanctions, to challenge China’s territorial claims in the South 
China Sea through a United Nations tribunal. Beijing flatly refused to 
take part in this arbitration process. Chinese paramilitary vessels con-
tinued to harass Filipino fishermen in the disputed areas and, in March 
2014, blockaded Filipino military forces stationed at the disputed Second 
Thomas shoal. 
Tensions similarly intensified between Beijing and Hanoi in May 2014 
when the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation deployed 
MH370, by Linda Jaivin
On 8 March 2014, the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing lost 
contact with air traffic control less than an hour after its departure. The plane was carry-
ing twelve Malaysian crew members and 227 passengers from fourteen nations — 152 
of them from China. A search team organised by the Malaysian, Chinese and Australian 
governments, aided by Japan, the US, South Korea and Vietnam, searched from the coast 
of Vietnam to the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, without discovering any debris. 
Relatives and friends of the missing passengers in China grew increasingly distressed 
and angry with the Malaysian government’s handling of the affair, including its perceived 
lack of transparency and delays in passing on information, and staged protests. Chinese 
state media also voiced criticism of Malaysia, and Chinese social media flared with anti- 
Malaysian sentiment. 
One plausible theory held that the plane was flying on autopilot, but ran out of fuel 
and crashed somewhere near the Australian coast — which still doesn’t explain why it 
was on autopilot or turned away from its course in the first place. Evidence in a report 
by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau in late June revealed an unexplained power 
outage early in the flight that may have been caused by tampering from the flight deck. 
In late June, the Malaysian government called pilot Zaharie Shah a ‘prime suspect ’, 
after investigators discovered that he had used his personal flight simulator to prac-
a deep sea oil rig in the vicinity of the disputed Paracel Islands 西沙群岛, 
with a supporting force of at least eighty ships including military vessels. 
Both the Chinese and Vietnamese sides claimed that the other’s ships had 
been ramming their own. Large-scale anti-China protests erupted in Viet-
nam targeting Chinese-owned businesses, causing a number of fatalities 
and serious injuries to Chinese nationals, and necessitating the evacuation 
by Beijing of more than 3,000 of its citizens.
In October 2013, meanwhile, President Xi visited Malaysia on a trip 
that was hailed by the Chinese media outlet Xinhua as ushering in ‘a new 
era in Sino-Malaysian ties’. In 2014, the two countries would celebrate for-
ty years of formal diplomatic relations. However, the mysterious disap-
pearance of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 with more than 150 Chinese 
nationals on board has strained mutual good will. China’s citizens were 
vocal in their anger at the lack of information coming from Kuala Lum-
tise journeys over the Indian 
Ocean. But there is no other 
evidence, no clear motive, 
and the case remains far 
from solved.
On 14 July, sixteen family 
members of victims went to 
the Malaysia Airlines’ office 
in Shunyi, Beijing to demand 
to see official video footage 
of passengers boarding the 
flight, which the airline had 
previously refused to release. The South China Morning Post reported that police arrived 
and detained all of them, and that two other female relatives of passengers alleged they 
were beaten by police officers ‘after asking for the release of two other relatives — a father 
and daughter — who had been detained on a separate occasion’. The grieving families’ 
demand is simple — in theory, at least: if the passengers are alive, they want to see them; 
if they are dead, they want to see the bodies. 
On 25 March 2014, family members of passengers on board flight 
MH370 marched on the Malaysian Embassy in Beijing demanding 
answers from the authorities
Source: Zhang Lintao
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pur and its mishandling of the search. Their frustration was shared by the 
Chinese authorities, who themselves often had to rely on media reports in 
the absence of official communications. 
A map of Beijing’s South China Sea claims included in Chinese pass-
ports and depicting those claims as encompassing the Natuna waters pro-
voked an equally hostile reaction from the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. In 
March 2014, Commodore Fahru Zaini, assistant deputy to the Indonesian 
chief security minister for defence strategic doctrine, noted that China’s 
claim now incorporated the waters around the Natuna Islands, which 
are part of the Riau Islands province of Indonesia. This prompted Jakarta 
to beef up its military presence in the South China Sea in the weeks and 
months that followed. 
Threats and Opportunities
Relations between China and Australia 
also took a tumble from the high point 
they enjoyed in April 2013 when the two 
countries established a formal ‘strategic 
partnership’. In September of that year, 
the newly elected Coalition government 
under Tony Abbott issued a statement 
in conjunction with the US and Japan, as 
members of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, expressing their opposition 
to the use of force to change the status quo in the East China Sea. The 
Australian response to China’s November 2013 ADIZ declaration was even 
more robust (and more sharply worded than that of even the US), with 
Canberra summoning the Chinese Ambassador to express its displeasure. 
When Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop visited Beijing the follow 
week, her frowning Chinese counterpart Wang Yi 王毅 publicly rebuked 
her and accused Australia of ‘jeopardising mutual trust’ and ‘affect[ing] 
Sino-Australian relations worsen in 2013. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi de-
nounced Australia’s criticism of China’s 
new air defence zone established over 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
Source: diplomattimes.tv
Russia–China Pipeline, by Jeremy Goldkorn
On 21 May 2014, on the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
in Asia (CICA), Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping looked on as Gazprom and the China National 
Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement for Russia to supply natural gas to China. 
The deal had been under negotiation for around a decade. Putin described the thirty-year, 
US$400 billion deal as ‘epochal’. 
For Russia and China, who have long viewed each other as ideal energy partners, the 
mutual benefits appeared to be clear. Russia gained a new customer for its gas at a time 
when its relationship with the United States and Europe had become increasingly tense in 
the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. China, meanwhile, is highly motivated to find 
sources of cleaner energy and the government had already pledged to more than double 
the country’s natural gas consumption by 2020.
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller told the media in Shanghai that the deal is Gazprom’s biggest 
ever. Russian news agencies said the contract, calling for thirty-eight billion cubic metres of 
gas a year from 2018, specified a price of about US$350 per thousand cubic metres, which 
is at the low end of what Gazprom currently charges export customers.  
The potential pipelines that will be used to deliver Russian natural gas to China under the new deal signed by 
Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation in May 2014
Source: RT/Gazprom
C
H
IN
A
 S
TO
R
Y 
YE
A
R
B
O
O
K
20
14
W
ho
se
 S
ha
re
d 
D
es
tin
y?
 
Ri
ch
ar
d 
Ri
gb
y 
an
d 
Br
en
do
n 
Ta
yl
or
70
71
the sound growth of bilateral relations’. An April visit by Abbott to Chi-
na (along with Japan and South Korea) appeared to go some way toward 
arresting this downward slide. With 600 business people in tow, Abbott’s 
visit even led to speculation that long-stalled Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
negotiations between China and Australia could be finalised by the end 
of the year. However, trilateral statements issued by Australia, Japan and 
the US on the sidelines of the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue — this time in 
relation to the South China Sea — continued to highlight ongoing tensions 
in the relationship between Beijing and Canberra. Officially, Australia still 
sees China’s rise as an opportunity rather than a threat (notwithstanding 
polling which indicates the majority of Australians see it as both), and the 
Australian Prime Minister and senior government figures continued to re-
iterate the importance of the bilateral relationship. 
While serious people in the Australian Department of Foreign Af-
fairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
worked hard to stabilise relations, a farcical but unwelcome episode was 
provided by businessman and MP Clive Palmer, of the eponymous Palm-
er United Party, and his Senate colleague Jacqui Lambie (see Forum ‘PUP 
Barking’, p.90). Angered by a falling out with his Chinese business partner, 
Palmer declared publicly that the Chinese were ‘mongrels’ who ‘shot their 
own people’. Lambie opined that Australia should double the size of its 
military given the threat of a ‘Chinese Communist invasion’. Prime Min-
ister Abbott and Foreign Minister Bishop were quick to condemn these 
remarks, and this was noted by the Chinese MFA spokesperson, while ex-
pressing China’s ‘strong indignation and severe condemnation’ of ‘Palm-
er’s insulting remarks’. The Global Times was less restrained, and follow-
ing some fierce words concluded that China should reappraise its view 
of Australia, while noting it was a distant trade partner, a destination for 
Chinese tourists and a place where Chinese children could learn English 
‘with a bit of an accent’. The episode ended with Palmer writing not one 
but two letters of apology to the Chinese Ambassador.
A Deal in the 
Making?
The only major coun-
try with which Chi-
na’s foreign relations 
do not appear to have 
gone backwards 
over the past year 
is Russia. Xi Jinping 
even chose Russia as 
the destination for 
his first foreign visit 
as president. During 
that visit he pledged 
to President Vladimir Putin that he would ‘closely coordinate [with him] 
on international regional affairs’. Then, in May 2014, Putin visited China, 
where he signed a deal that was a decade in the making for Russia to sup-
ply China with up to thirty-eight billion cubic metres of gas per year for 
thirty years starting in 2018.
Putin also attended the fourth summit of the CICA in Shanghai. CICA 
is a multilateral organisation whose most influential members are China 
and Russia and which is being chaired by China from 2014 to 2016. Xi used 
his keynote address to the 2014 CICA summit to propose a new ‘Asian secu-
rity concept’: that Asia’s problems should be solved by Asians themselves, 
not by external powers such as the United States. Putin’s visit coincided 
with the aforementioned week-long military exercise between Chinese 
and Russian forces in the East China Sea. 
Most international relations analysts outside China and Russia sug-
gest that there is less than meets the eye to the warming of relations be-
tween Beijing and Moscow and warn against over-exaggeration. Even if 
one accepts that Sino-Russian relations have made some gains over the 
Relations between China and Russia strengthen: Presidents Putin and Xi, 
shown here at the 2014 APEC Summit held in Beijing. Their growing per-
sonal relationship emulates their countries’ converging interests in trade, 
investment and geopolitics 
Source: People’s Daily Online
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last year, the more pressing question is why Beijing’s relations with so 
many of its other neighbours have gone backwards.
Shared Destiny or Grand Strategy Disaster?
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus. Brad Glosserman, executive di-
rector of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies 
in Honolulu, for instance, characterises Beijing’s current foreign policy 
approach as a ‘grand strategy disaster’ driven by a desire to secure the 
resource and energy needs required to fuel the country’s continued eco-
nomic growth. Rory Medcalf of Australia’s Lowy Institute for International 
Policy, by contrast, sees it as a ‘premature power play’ by a Chinese lead-
ership that has misjudged the extent of its still growing power and influ-
ence. The Australian defence analyst Hugh White, meanwhile, attributes 
Chinese foreign policy over the last year to a carefully calibrated effort to 
test suspect US alliances and strategic partnerships with the goal of under-
mining American power and influence in the Western Pacific.
If the reasoning behind Chinese foreign policy behaviour remains 
hotly contested, its potential consequences are clearer — and unsettling. 
The last twelve months have seen China forcefully assert its own inter-
ests vis-à-vis those of its neighbours and become more isolated as a conse-
quence, particularly as its neighbours begin to co-ordinate their strategies 
in response. It is true that it is still early days for President Xi’s leadership. 
As Zhai Kun 翟崑, formerly of the China Institute of Contemporary Inter-
national Relations (CICIR) has observed in an essay analysing Xi’s foreign 
policy approach: ‘it is extremely difficult for the new leaders to make cor-
rect situational judgments and balance the timing, strength and rhythm 
of decision-making and implementation in a dynamic and smart way. Di-
plomacy is an art of experience and skills are gained through long-term 
practice. There is much to expect in this regard.’
By the same token, Xi’s actions in this and other areas are not those 
of a fledgling leader struggling to find his way. The heated exchanges wit-
nessed between China and both the US and Japan at the June 2014 Shangri-
La Dialogue could well be a sign of things to come. If over the coming year 
the gap between China’s stated policies of good neighbourliness and the 
reality as perceived by others widens rather than narrows, the rhetoric 
of a ‘community of shared destiny’ may increasingly beg the questions: 
‘Whose community? Whose destiny?’
This text is taken from Shared Destiny, edited by Geremie R Barmé, 
Linda Jaivin and Jeremy Goldkorn, published 2015 by ANU Press, 
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
